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THE REJECTION OF LAW AS A GOVERNANCE 
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A number of large private equity firms have conducted public 
offerings in recent years.  Up to this point, these offerings have been 
noteworthy primarily for their use of non-corporate forms, such as limited 
partnerships and limited liability companies.  This Article argues that these 
recent offerings have done something even more significant—they have 
developed a new governance model for large firms.  This new model not 
only rejects most of the protections that corporate shareholders have 
become accustomed to, but also rejects most of the partnership and non-
corporate governance mechanisms as well.  What remains are investor 
protection devices that do not rely on legal enforcement—mechanisms such 
as the alignment of managers’ and outside investors’ economic interests 
and reliance on reputational constraints to guide managerial behavior.  This 
Article investigates in detail the formation documents and regulatory filings 
of every private equity firm to conduct a public offering in the United 
States.  It describes how these firms have eliminated traditional governance 
devices, both corporate and non-corporate, presents the primarily extra-
legal protections on which investors must rely, and raises questions and 
concerns about the reliability and effectiveness of this new governance 
model. 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 58 
I. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLICLY-HELD PRIVATE 
EQUITY FIRM .................................................................................... 62 
A. The Corporate Governance Model and the Private Equity 
Alternative ................................................................................. 62 
1. Differences in Operating Portfolio Companies .................... 63 
2. Differences in Structuring Private Equity Funds ................. 64 
 
* Associate Professor, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law.  Thanks to the 
participants at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association and the Tulane 
Speakers Series for providing comments on earlier drafts of this paper, to Loyola University 
New Orleans College of Law for the financial support that allowed this article to be written, 
and to Keriann Langley for her excellent research assistance. 
58 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:1 
 
B. Introduction of the Publicly-held Private Equity Firms ............ 65 
II. (NON-)USE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES BY PPE 
FIRMS ................................................................................................ 67 
A. The Ineffective Protection Afforded by Voting Rights ............. 68 
1. Majority Control in PPE Firms ............................................ 69 
B. Treatment of Fiduciary Duties ....................................... 73 
1. Waiver .................................................................... 74 
2. Elimination of Personal Liability ............................ 75 
3. Conflict Cures ......................................................... 76 
C. Embracing the Buffer—Inclusion of Provisions that 
Insulate the Board.......................................................... 77 
1. Staggered Boards .................................................... 77 
2. Control Share Acquisition Triggers ........................ 78 
3. NYSE Governance Rules Opt-outs......................... 79 
III.PPE REJECTION OF NON-CORPORATE LEGAL NORMS—DURATION 
LIMITS AND MANDATORY DISTRIBUTIONS ...................................... 80 
IV.PPE FIRMS AND THE REJECTION OF LAW AS A GOVERNANCE 
MODEL .............................................................................................. 83 
A. Rejection of Legally Enforceable Limits ................................... 83 
B. Emphasis on Extra-legal Incentives........................................... 84 
1. Focus on Economic Alignment ............................................ 84 
2. Reliance on Reputational Checks ........................................ 86 
C. Further Distance from Legal Constraints—The Attempt to 
Restrict Private Litigation .......................................................... 86 
V. QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS RAISED BY THE NEW MODEL ................ 88 
A. How Aligned are the Economic Interests? ................................ 88 
B. Limited Usefulness of Reputational Constraints ....................... 91 
1. Evidence from the Financial Crisis ...................................... 91 
2.  Significance of the Sophistication of Investors ................... 92 
C. Uncertainties of Enforcement and Application ......................... 93 
D. The Mediating Effect of Price ................................................... 93 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................ 94 
 
INTRODUCTION 
John Armour, Henry Hansmann, and Reinier Kraakman famously 
describe the function of corporate law as a mechanism for providing 
business enterprises with a form that possesses certain desirable attributes: 
“legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, delegated 
management . . ., and investor ownership.”
1
  Once this form is established, 
 
 1.  REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1 (2d ed. 2009). 
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reducing costs of operating those businesses serves as a second, equally 
important function of corporate law.
2
  Primary among these costs is the 
need to monitor those who act opportunistically to the detriment of the 
organization.  These costs are also known as agency costs.  Agency costs 
may be fought in a variety of ways.  Legislators and courts may adopt 
broad legal rules in the form of statutes and precedent.
3
  Parties may 
voluntarily enter into contracts that limit their behavior.
4
  These contracts 
become legally binding obligations of the parties and may be enforced in 
court.  But, parties are not limited to, and do not constrain themselves to, 
purely formal or legal strategies to minimize agency costs.  They also craft 
incentives to align the interests of the actors with those of the larger group 
in the hope and expectation that those actors will act in the best interests of 
the group, even absent some form of legal sanction.
5
 
All forms of business organization use some combination of these 
three methods, both legal and extra-legal, to combat agency costs.  
Business organizations each have a foundational statute that allocates 
authority, financial obligation, and entitlement.
6
  Many individual 
businesses use contracts to further customize governance relationships, 
often through such common forms as a partnership agreement or a 
corporate shareholders agreement.  All business entities also rely on extra-
legal means, such as financial incentive and reputational constraint, in 
order to guide the conduct of their agents. 
However, not all forms of business organization rely on these methods 
to the same extent.  In order to contain agency costs, public corporations 
place a relatively heavy reliance on the first method: formal legal rules 
such as mandatory shareholder voting and judicial enforcement of fiduciary 
duties.  Some believe that this reliance leads to inefficient monitoring and 
to relatively poor performance.  In fact, many private equity firms have 
attributed their financial success to their ability to overcome these 
shortcomings and to provide more efficient, engaged leadership.
7
 
This financial success has led to an astonishing increase in demand to 
 
 2.  Id. at 2. 
 3.  See id. at 39 (discussing legislative strategies for reducing agency costs). 
 4.  Id. at 23. 
 5.  Id., at 42-43. 
 6.  See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT (2007) (governing domestic and foreign 
corporations); REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT (2006) (governing limited liability 
companies); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997) (governing general and limited partnerships). 
 7.  See Martin Steindl, The Alignment of Interests Between the General and Limited 
Partner in a Private Equity Fund—The Ultimate Governance Nut to Crack?, HARV. L. SCH. 
F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. 2 (Feb. 2013), 
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2013/02/The-Alignment-of-Interests-between-
the-General-and-the-Limited-Partner-in-a-Private-Equity-Fund__Full-Article-1.pdf 
(discussing the superiority of private equity fund governance). 
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invest in private equity firms.  From only about $3 billion before 1980,
8
 
investment in private equity jumped to more than $500 billion globally by 
2007,
9
 when private equity firms were regularly outperforming broad 
market averages over both the short and long term.
10
  Investors continued to 
want to participate in this segment of the market, but participation had 
traditionally been limited to institutions and other investors with very high 
net worth.
11
  Some of the biggest firms recognized this intense demand and 
provided a novel solution—they would conduct a public offering 
themselves so that individual investors could purchase shares in their 
management companies.
12
  These firms went public in 2007 when The 
Blackstone Group, L.P., Fortress Investment Group, LLC, and Och-Ziff 
Capital Management, LLC all held public offerings.
13
  The financial crisis 
soon halted this trend, along with a great deal of economic activity across 
the globe.
14
  Recently, the public offering of private equity firm shares has 
resumed, with KKR & Co., L.P., Apollo Global Management, LLC, 
Oaktree Capital Group, LLC, and The Carlyle Group, L.P. all now being 
publicly traded in the United States. 
Currently, there are seven publicly-held private equity firms (“PPE 
Firms”) whose shares trade in the United States.  As one might expect, 
these PPE Firms do not operate as traditional public corporations.  
Generally speaking, PPE Firms reject what they consider the inefficient 
 
 8.  Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? 
The Effects of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 CHI. L. REV. 
219, 225 (2009). 
 9.  Id. at 225 n.28 (citing Viral V. Acharya et al., Private Equity: Boom or Bust?, 19 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 44 (2007)). 
 10.  See Geoffrey Colvin & Ram Charan, Private Equity, Private Lives, FORTUNE, Nov. 
27, 2006, at 192, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/11/27/8394344/ (noting that 
in both the last year and over the past ten years, private equity firms significantly 
outperformed the S&P 500). 
 11.  See Mohsen Manesh, Legal Asymmetry and the End of Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 465, 471 (2009) [hereinafter, Manesh, Legal Asymmetry] (noting that the 2007 
IPOs of Blackstone, Fortress, and Och-Ziff opened the door to allow average investors 
trading on the public markets to invest in private equity firms). 
 12.  See Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1, 7 (2008) (describing private equity firms as traditionally private partnerships, 
but stating that their business model is in flux). 
 13.  See id. at 60 (describing a February 2007 IPO by Fortress Investment Group as the 
catalyst of PPE firm public offerings, followed shortly thereafter by Blackstone); Manesh, 
Legal Asymmetry, supra note 11, at 465 (claiming that the 2007 initial public offerings of 
the private equity firms Blackstone, Fortress, and Och-Ziff challenged the notion that 
publicly held firms were organized as corporations, subject to the usual rules, checks, and 
balances of standard corporate law). 
 14.  See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 12 (discussing the potential of the recent 
financial crisis to discredit the private equity model). 
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monitoring mechanisms of corporate governance.
15
  In fact, PPE Firms 
have chosen to organize not as corporations at all, but in every case as 
either a limited partnership or limited liability company.  Though unusual, 
this is not unprecedented.  There are eighty-five non-corporate firms that 
are publicly-traded in the United States.
16
  Most of these firms have also 
rejected mandatory legal rules such as shareholder voting and strong-form 
fiduciary duties in favor of more customized contractual limits.
17
  Common 
examples of contractual limitations preferred by non-corporate firms 
include providing for a limited duration of the entity and requiring periodic 
distributions to shareholders during the life of the organization.
18
  PPE 
Firms are unique for uniformly rejecting the idea of replacing the 
corporate-style mandatory legal rules with the non-corporate, customized 
contractual rules.  This leaves only the social norms and non-compulsory 
incentives as the primary means of controlling the agency costs of PPE 
Firms. 
This Article describes public investors’ governance rights in PPE 
Firms, compares those rights to protections provided in other entities, and 
assesses their adequacy.  Part I describes PPE Firms’ organizational 
structure and places it in a broader governance context; explains the 
dominant corporate governance model; contrasts that model both to how 
PPE Firms operate corporations in which they invest and to the governance 
structure that PPE Firms use in their own funds; and explains the difference 
between investing in a PPE Firm (the primary concern of this article), 
investing in a private equity firm’s operating fund, or investing in a 
portfolio company run by that fund.  Part II traces how PPE Firms have 
stripped the primary governance mechanisms used by corporations from 
their models primarily, though not exclusively, by incorporating broad 
fiduciary duty waivers into their governing documents.  It also describes 
how PPE funds adopt corporate-style buffers, used by many public 
corporations to avoid the harsher risks of direct shareholder interference in 
governance, even though the PPE Firms are not subject to those risks in the 
first instance.  Part III notes that PPE Firms do not replace these missing 
corporate governance mechanisms with the traditional non-corporate 
mechanisms one might expect, and examines the practices of constraining 
managerial discretion through mandatory distributions and finite duration.  
In Part IV, the Article concludes that PPE Firms have developed a new 
 
 15.  See infra Part II. 
 16.  Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware Alternative Entity Law: 
Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555, 558 (2011) [hereinafter 
Manesh, Contractual Freedom]. 
 17.  See infra Part III. 
 18.  See Larry E. Ribstein, Partnership Governance of Large Firms, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
289, 290 (2009) (discussing the use of limited firm duration and required distributions to 
owners as a substitute for typical corporate monitoring devices). 
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governance model that forsakes the protections of law almost entirely.  To 
the extent that outside investors are able to monitor and hold insiders 
accountable, they do so primarily through extra-legal means such as 
aligning the financial incentives of insiders with public investors and 
relying on reputational checks to constrain managerial behavior.  Finally, 
Part V raises several questions and concerns about PPE Firms’ reliance on 
extra-legal governance mechanisms. 
I. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PUBLICLY-HELD 
PRIVATE EQUITY FIRM 
In order to understand a public investor’s rights in a PPE Firm, it is 
important to first understand the broader context of firm governance.  This 
Part begins with a general description of the primary features of corporate 
governance, and then explains how private equity firms reject those 
features, both in their investments and in the structure of their funds.  Once 
the differences in governance are established between corporations and 
private equity firms, this Part turns to PPE Firms themselves.  It identifies 
that investors in PPE Firms have governance rights that differ from each of 
these forms and that insiders in these firms owe conflicting allegiances to 
different constituencies. 
A. The Corporate Governance Model and the Private Equity 
Alternative 
The structure of corporate governance is based on the notion of 
separating ownership and control—shareholders invest capital and directors 
exercise control.
19
  Shareholders monitor directors through a variety of 
mechanisms, the most prominent of which are the election of directors by 
annual voting
20
 and the imposition of fiduciary duties upon the directors.
21
  
Shareholder voting serves as a monitoring device by allowing those whose 
capital is at stake to have a periodic say in the identity of those entrusted 
with the power to make decisions on behalf of the organization.  Fiduciary 
 
 19.  See generally Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and 
Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301 (1983) (discussing the corporate model wherein decision 
makers within a corporation are not substantially affected financially by the outcome of 
their decisions). 
 20.  See Manesh, Legal Asymmetry, supra note 11, at 472 (describing shareholder 
franchise as a standard corporate law tool intended to ensure that corporate managers remain 
accountable to the owners of the firm). 
 21.  See id, at 473 (noting that corporate law balances the weaknesses of shareholder 
franchise by imposing upon managers certain fiduciary duties, a legally enforceable 
minimum standard of conduct developed by courts and intended to ensure managerial 
accountability); Ribstein, supra note 18, at 296 (explaining how corporate managers’ 
fiduciary duties supplement shareholder monitoring power). 
2013] PUBLICLY-HELD PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS  63 
 
duties monitor directors by articulating a heightened standard of conduct to 
which directors will be held accountable.  Shareholders enforce this higher 
standard through litigation.  Scholars have written extensively about both 
the strengths and weaknesses of this structure.
22
 
To the extent that the shareholder franchise is effective, the role of 
fiduciary duties becomes more limited.
23
  If shareholders can replace the 
board annually, then the additional protection gained by labeling the 
directors as fiduciaries involves the protection of minority shareholders. 
However, shareholder voting is largely ineffective in most major public 
corporations.  This lack of an effective franchise means that the annual vote 
for directors provides only a minimal monitoring check and that fiduciary 
duties must play a larger role in monitoring boards of public companies.
24
  
This combination of ineffective shareholder voting and heavy reliance on 
fiduciary duties, usually enforced post hoc by shareholders bringing claims 
for breach, leads many critics to challenge the efficacy of corporate 
governance in monitoring managerial behavior.
25
 
1. Differences in Operating Portfolio Companies 
Private equity firms have been vocal critics of the traditional corporate 
governance system.  Private equity firms attribute their investing success to 
the ability to diverge from the norm of corporate governance.
26
  This 
divergence is typified by the changes that private equity firms make to the 
governance of corporations in whom they invest, often referred to as 
portfolio companies.  Once private equity firms make an investment, they 
require a large degree of control, close monitoring of management, and 
revision of compensation practices to closely align corporate success with 
enhanced pay.
27
  Commentators have argued that the hands-on form of 
 
 22.  See, e.g., Manesh, Legal Asymmetry, supra note 11 at 473 (discussing the strengths 
and weaknesses of corporate structures); see infra part III for a detailed discussion of these 
other constraints. 
 23.  See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 836 (2005) (’discussing the view that “as long as shareholders have 
the power to replace the directors, corporate decisions can be expected to serve shareholder 
interests.”). 
 24.  See id. at 17 (discussing the lack of fiduciary duties in public companies). 
 25.  See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 19, at 18 (noting the lack of governance devices 
available to shareholders in public companies). 
 26.  See Masulis & Thomas, supra note 8, at 227 (claiming that private equity 
transactions create value by leading to improved corporate governance and therefore 
reducing agency cost); Ribstein, supra note 18, at 299 (claiming that substituting these 
incentive devices for monitoring is a particularly efficient tradeoff in private equity firms 
given the high costs of constraining the discretion of expert managers). 
 27.  Phillip Leslie & Paul Oyer, Managerial Incentives and Value Creation: Evidence 
from Private Equity 15 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14331, 2008), 
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governance employed by private equity provides many benefits, including 
reducing managerial discretion to misuse free cash flow, realigning 
managerial incentives, heightening managerial sensitivity to firm 
performance, improving internal reporting, and enhancing the ability to 
replace under-performing managers.
28
 
This alternative governance seems to have been effective. Private 
equity firms have long touted themselves as an alternative to, and often an 
improvement on, public companies with traditional management 
structures.
29
  Private equity firms have outperformed broad market 
averages, over both the short and long terms, and both before and after the 
recent financial crisis.
30
  Both popular and academic commentators attribute 
this success to governance, the hands-on management of seasoned private 
equity executives, and the clear and closely monitored incentives that 
private equity firms provide to their portfolio companies.
31
 
2. Differences in Structuring Private Equity Funds 
The corporate-style separation of ownership and control can be 
inefficient and expensive, as described above.  This can be particularly 
difficult when attempting to monitor managers who employ some 
specialization or expertise similar to investment and finance.
32
  Private 
equity firms themselves, apart from their portfolio companies, have long 
been regarded as a contrast to this structure.  These firms do more than 
simply act as hands-on managers of their funds.  Instead, they forsake the 
 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w14331 (quoting literature that claims private 
equity firms create value by improving management and citing three mechanisms that do 
so). 
 28.  Cheffins & Armour, supra note 12, at 4 (quoting executives at private equity firms 
belittling traditional corporate governance mechanisms). 
 29.  See Tony Jackson, Public-company model worse than private equity, FIN. TIMES 
(Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fd8626b8-a304-11df-8cf4-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2OrojnKp2 (noting the benefits of the private equity structure 
compared to public companies). 
 30.  See Les Berglass, What Public Companies Can Learn from Private Equity, FORBES 
(Oct. 6, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/2010/10/06/hilfiger-starbucks-aig-financial-advisor-
network-private-equity.html (arguing that the ability to focus on larger goals, instead of 
short snapshots in time, contributes to the success of private equity firms over public 
companies); Colvin & Charan, supra note 10 (exploring strategies that private equity firms 
use to make them more efficient than public companies, such as the exemption from 
reporting salary in SEC filings). 
 31.  See Masulis & Thomas, supra note 8, at 219-20 (discussing the advantages that 
private equity firms offer as opposed to public companies, such as the reduction of board 
size and the improvement in the flow of information). 
 32.  See id. (finding that private equity investors are better risk monitors with better 
incentives than public shareholders at firms with significant derivative trading activity and 
derivative contract positions). 
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corporate form altogether and organize their investment funds as limited 
partnerships or limited liability companies.
33
 
When a private equity firm is structured as a partnership, professionals 
who run the fund can be members of the general partner, owners of the 
management services entity, or both.  The professionals will cause a limited 
partnership to be formed for the purpose of investing in portfolio 
companies.  They provide this fund with a small percentage of its capital 
(usually one percent) and all of the investment and other operational 
expertise.  The fund managers will then raise money, usually from 
institutional investors or high net-worth individuals.  These investors 
provide the capital used by the firm in its investments and become limited 
partners in the private equity fund. 
Investors in private equity funds do not have any of the corporate-style 
monitoring protections.  Instead of relying on voting and fiduciary 
obligations as monitoring devices, the firms use a limitation on the duration 
of the entity itself, a requirement that available funds be distributed to its 
owners, and an alignment of economic interests between the managers and 
the investors to ensure that those in control of the organization act in the 
best interest of the investors.
34
  Limiting the duration of the firm gives the 
managers an incentive to manage with a view toward producing returns in a 
finite period of time.  Mandatory distributions similarly focus the effort of  
manager on producing returns that will be given to the investors.  Finally, 
the alignment of economic interest between manager and investor provides 
the manager with a financial incentive to act in the interest of the 
investor—when the investor makes money, so does the fund manager. 
B. Introduction of the Publicly-held Private Equity Firms 
This governance structure gains another level of complexity when 
private equity firms issue shares to the public.  PPE Firms invest in 
portfolio companies, using hands-on management in an attempt to increase 
 
 33.  Ribstein, supra note 18, at 298 (noting that private-equity buyout firms are a 
leading example of the use of partnership mechanisms in governing large firms); see 
William W. Bratton, Private Equity’s Three Lessons for Agency Theory, 3 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 1, 1 (2008) (describing how private equity funds are organized); Joseph E. 
Bachelder III, Executive Compensation, N. Y. L. J., August 29, 2007, available at 
http://www.jebachelder.com/articles/070829.html (displaying an organizational chart of a 
typical private equity fund). 
 34.  Ribstein, supra note 18, at 298-99 (noting that buyouts are financed by funds 
organized as limited partnerships managed by the buyout firm’s general partners, and 
describing four incentives: “First, managers are motivated by high-powered incentive 
compensation. . . .  Second, partners are automatically cashed out of the fund on expiration 
of the fund’s limited term . . . .  Third, limited partnership agreements provide some 
assurance of distributions . . . .  Fourth, the discipline provided by the above features 
substitutes for corporate-type monitoring”). 
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returns, but the management company itself also issues shares to the public, 
sharing its largely fee-based income with those new investors. 
This structure is rather complex, as demonstrated by the organization 
of the Blackstone Group, one of the first private equity firms to sell shares 
to the public.
35
  In Blackstone, the private equity funds that invest in 
portfolio companies are five distinct “Blackstone Holdings” limited 
partnerships.
36
  Outside investors will invest in those limited partnerships, 
which Blackstone will manage through general partnership entities.
37
  In 
the end, these entities are consolidated in one management company, The 
Blackstone Group, L.P.
38
  Public investors may participate in this 
management company.  The managers participate directly in the ownership 
of the “Holdings” entities, and in the ownership of the public entity. 
Early scholarship on these PPE Firms focused on the impact of public 
ownership on the private equity business model.
39
  It was feared that any 
advantages that governance of private equity firms had over traditional 
corporations would be lost as these firms took on public shareholders.
40
  
This scholarship also acknowledged that investors in the PPE Firms are in a 
different position from the limited partners in a traditional private equity 
fund.
41
  While limited partnerships receive the bulk of the capital from the 
performance of portfolio companies, investors in PPE Firms are a step 
removed.  These investors are only entitled to a fraction of the management 
and other fees that the managers of the private equity funds receive, which 
is based on the overall size of the funds and the performance of the 
portfolio companies. 
This distinct position has implications for the governance of the firm.  
Managers of PPE Firms are balanced in between two masters—the limited 
partners of their funds, who invest capital and whose objective is to 
maximize the returns on the fund’s portfolio while minimizing fees, and the 
 
 35.  Blackstone Grp. L.P., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1) 16 (June 21, 
2007). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 12, at 59 (claiming that it “could become a 
trend that would fundamentally alter the private equity industry”) (citing Peter Smith, 
Private Equity Seeds Public Vehicles, FIN. TIMES, June 13, 2006, at 19); see, e.g., Victor 
Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REV. 89 (2008) (analyzing the tax incentives for 
organizing in a non-corporate form). 
 40.  See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 12, at 8 (warning that public offerings of 
private equity firms may become a trend and would radically transform the industry and that 
“ultimately could culminate in private equity firms becoming broadly based financial groups 
akin to elite investment banks.”). 
 41.  See id. at 60 (commenting that PPE investor returns are generated by management 
fees and carry interest, in contrast with the returns of limited partners, which stem directly 
from the performance of portfolio companies). 
2013] PUBLICLY-HELD PRIVATE EQUITY FIRMS  67 
 
PPE investors, who hope to maximize fee income, as their return is entirely 
derived from it.
42
  The remainder of this paper is devoted to an 
investigation of how PPE Firms have solved this puzzle, and an assessment 
of whether the solution is satisfactory.   
One way that PPE Firms have assertively not solved the puzzle is 
through traditional legal means.  As described in Part II, PPE Firms lack 
almost all of the most basic shareholder protections found in corporate law.  
This is not surprising, as none of the PPE Firms are corporations, and the 
funds they operate are similarly lacking in these corporate characteristics.  
Part III proceeds to describe that, unlike the private equity funds operated 
by PPE Firms, the PPE Firm also lacks traditional legal protections found 
in non-corporate entities.   
Given this structure, one might wonder if PPE investors lack the 
sophistication to recognize that their objectives are at odds with those of 
the limited partners.  But such an assessment does not paint the entire 
picture.  Sophisticated institutions are invested in these firms and new firms 
continue to go public, yet the market has not collapsed on them.  The 
assertion that investors are irrational or delusional does not provide a 
satisfactory answer to this phenomenon.  Instead, a clearer, more complete 
picture is revealed when taking into account both legal and extra-legal 
investor protections.  As described in Part IV, PPE Firms rely almost 
entirely on extra-legal mechanisms of investor protection.  Relying on these 
extra-legal methods can be both rational and efficient.  However, this 
reliance exposes PPE investors to significant risks, as discussed in Part V 
of this article.  
II. (NON-)USE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES BY 
PPE FIRMS 
Corporations have developed many mechanisms over the years by 
which shareholders can hold directors accountable.  The two primary 
methods are the shareholder franchise and the imposition of fiduciary 
duties.  This Part will describe the approach that PPE Firms take with 
regards to both of these accountability mechanisms.  Shareholder voting is 
not an effective check on managerial discretion in PPE Firms.
43
  Because 
the managers of PPE Firms own such a large percentage of the overall 
 
 42.  See id. at 65 (warning that “[o]nce a public offering has been carried out, those 
running a private equity firm have to carry out a delicate balancing act, seeking to maximize 
the fee-income driven returns of unit holders (or shareholders) while pleasing limited 
partners in the buyout funds who are ultimately paying those fees”). 
 43.  See infra Part II.A (noting that it is not necessarily a bad thing for controlling 
shareholders to have discretion to make operational decisions, but is more risky, as private 
equity managers can receive significant compensation from sources other than their share 
ownership). 
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equity of the firm, insiders can control the outcome of virtually every 
matter that could be put to a vote.  Also, these firms do not submit many 
important matters to shareholder vote.  In PPE entities, voting is limited to 
certain matters, and significant authority is delegated to a general partner, 
manager, or similar body, over which shareholders have little or no control.  
This lack of effective voice through voting places a greater emphasis on 
fiduciary duties as a method for investor protection. 
Fiduciary duties have been thoroughly gutted by PPE Firms.
44
  Several 
firms waive the duties entirely, or waive them with regard to large areas of 
insider conduct.  For those duties that remain, many PPE Firms eliminate 
personal liability of insiders for breach.  Finally, all of the PPE Firms 
provide conflict cure provisions in their organizing documents.  These 
provisions have the potential to define away many conflicts in the same 
manner as the fiduciary obligations owed to the firm. 
There is one aspect of corporate governance that PPE Firms have 
embraced—the adoption of measures to insulate boards from shareholder 
interference.
45
  So, even though shareholders initially have little or no 
power, PPE Firm managers have adopted several prominent devices that 
protect them from unwanted shareholder interference.  The most popular of 
these devices are the adoption of staggered boards, the inclusion of control 
share acquisition triggers, and opting out of NYSE governance rules. 
A. The Ineffective Protection Afforded by Voting Rights 
Corporate shareholders use voting as a means of monitoring director 
behavior and participating in firm governance.  Voting is typically utilized 
for the annual election of directors, the approval of fundamental 
transactions, or for changes to the corporate charter.  This tool can be 
effective, particularly in the close corporation setting, but is often 
ineffective in large corporations with widely dispersed shareholders. 
None of the seven PPE Firms provide for meaningful shareholder 
voting.
46
  The organizational documents of PPE Firms typically allow for 
managers to exercise broad discretion without having their authority 
subjected to a shareholder vote.  Further, insiders own such a large portion 
of the voting control of their firms that all major decisions put to a vote can 
be decided with the assent of insiders, without regard to the preferences of 
the public investors. 
 
 44.  See infra Part II.B (discussing PPE Firms’ ability to circumvent fiduciary duties 
through use of unincorporated entities). 
 45.  See infra Part II.C (discussing PPE Firms’ use of three corporate governance 
methods to protect managers from unwanted shareholder interference). 
 46.  See infra Part V.A (noting that lack of shareholder voting can become an issue 
because of the potential for dis-alignment of economic interests). 
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1. Majority Control in PPE Firms 
Voting does not give public shareholders a voice in PPE Firm 
management because they are all heavily insider-owned.
47
  As a result, 
public shareholders do not have enough votes to take or block action.  On 
the one hand, the retention of majority voting control by insiders simply 
reflects that insiders continue to own a significant portion of the economic 
interest in the firm.  This connection between ownership and control is one 
of the techniques the private equity firms use in their portfolio companies 
and one that they tout as an improvement over traditional corporate 
governance.
48
  On the other hand, however, PPE Firms divide their shares 
into separate classes to ensure that insiders retain majority-voting rights 
that may diverge substantially from their economic interest in the firm.  In 
each case, as illustrated in the chart below, insiders continue to control a 
very large portion of voting control on the date of the firm’s IPO.  This 
voting control relates to, but does not directly correlate with, the economic 
interest held by insiders. 
 
 
 47.  Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 16, at 570.  Professor Manesh’s study 
did not collect ownership data on all publicly held alternative entities.  As Manesh explains, 
“[b]ecause this study focuses on operating agreements and not ownership structure, we did 
not examine the extent to which a firm’s managers are also full-fledged owners of the firm, 
a matter that is, at least partly, outside of the terms of the contract.”  Id. 
 48.  See supra part I.A.1. 
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PPE Firm % Voting Rights of  
Insiders at IPO 
Apollo 86.5%
49
 
Blackstone 87.3%
50
 
Carlyle 100%, except in unusual 
circumstances.
51
 
Fortress Approx. 90%
52
 
KKR 75%
53
 
Oaktree 98.23%
54
 
Och-Ziff 74.4%
55
 
 
 49.  Apollo Global Mgmt., LLC, Registration Statement 14 (Form S-1) (Apr. 8, 2008).  
Leon Black, Joshua Harris, and Mark Rowan, AGM’s managing partners, own and control 
BRH Holdings GP, Ltd. (“BRH”), the general partner of BRH Holdings LP (“Holdings”). 
BRH is a limited partnership that is 100% owned, directly and indirectly, by AGM’s 
managing and contributing partners.  Through BRH, AGM’s managing and contributing 
partners own 71.1% of the Apollo Operating Group (“AOG”) limited partnership interests.  
AGM issued BRH a single Class B share solely to grant BRH voting power.  The share 
initially had 240,000,000 votes per share, and represented 86.5% of the total voting power 
of the AGM shares entitled to vote.  However, the voting power of the Class B share is not 
static; it fluctuates in accordance with changes in Holdings’ economic interest in the AOG 
entities.  Id. 
 50.  Blackstone Grp. L.P., Amended Registration Statement 235 (Form S-1) (June 21, 
2007).  Blackstone issued one “special voting unit” to Blackstone Partners LLC (“BP 
LLC”).  Blackstone’s senior managing directors wholly own BP LLC.  This “special voting 
unit” provides Blackstone’s prior owners with a number of votes equal to the aggregate 
number of vested and unvested BPUs held by the limited partners of Blackstone Holdings 
(excluding Blackstone and its subsidiaries) on the relevant record date and entitles the prior 
owners to participate in the vote on the same basis as the common unitholders.  Immediately 
after the IPO, the special voting unit issued to BP LLC represented 87.3% of the total voting 
power of Blackstone’s units.  Id. 
 51.  Carlyle Grp. L.P., Registration Statement 242-43 (Form S-1) (Sept. 6, 2011). 
 52.  Fortress Inv. Grp. LLC, Registration Statement 8, 124 (Form S-1) (Nov. 8, 2006).  
Through their ownership of the class B shares, which represent 90% of the voting power of 
the FIG LLC shares, the principals control the election of the directors.  Id. 
 53.  KKR & Co., Registration Statement 160 (Form S-1) (July 3, 2007).  KKR 
Management LLC (“KKR LLC”) manages KKR, its General Partner (“Managing Partner”).  
KKR LLC is a limited liability company governed by a six-person Board of Directors.  
KKR’s founders, directors and co-CEOs—Kravis and Roberts—who control 75% of the 
shares entitled to vote on the election of directors, appoint all of the directors on KKR 
LLC’s Board of Directors.  Id. 
 54.  Oaktree Capital Grp., LLC, Registration Statement 57 (Form S-1) (June 17, 2011).  
Currently, of the matters that must be submitted to an OCG shareholder vote, the only 
matter that the principals could not control by virtue of their indirect control of the class B 
shares and the 98.23% of the voting power that they represent is a proposed amendment to 
the OCG operating agreement: (1) that would have a material adverse effect on class A 
relative to class B, (2) that is not in a shareholder-approved merger agreement, and (3) that 
the board does not have explicit permission to make without shareholder approval by virtue 
of Section 10.3.  Id. 
 55.  Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, Registration Statement 40 (Form S-1) (Nov. 9, 
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2. Further Minimizing Minority Voice 
 
Even if public investors control a significant portion of the PPE Firms’ 
shares, the firms have developed devices to minimize the input of outsiders.  
Strategies employed include providing a mechanism for insiders to elect a 
majority of the board or similar governing body, regardless of ownership 
interest; limiting number of issues that may be put to a shareholder vote; 
and continuing super-voting privileges of special classes of stock. 
A smaller governing body, often called a “board,” whose members are 
largely appointed by insiders, manages each of the seven PPE Firms.  In a 
typical provision, Och-Ziff accomplishes this by dividing its shares into 
two classes, class A and class B, and issues class A shares to the public 
while retaining class B shares for insiders.
56
  Then, its operating agreement 
provides that class B shareholders have the right to elect five of the seven 
members of the board.
57
  This type of voting limitation is common among 
both PPE Firms and publicly traded entities that are not corporations 
generally.
58
 
Narrowing the number of issues that a public shareholder may vote on 
is another common device that limits voting rights.  Each PPE Firm uses 
this mechanism to some extent and KKR provides a fairly typical set of 
provisions.  KKR’s partnership agreement limits voting to matters that 
include a transfer of a majority of the managing partnership interest to an 
outside entity, an election to dissolve the partnership, or a merger or sale of 
substantially all of the partnership’s assets.
59
  Carlyle’s partnership 
 
2007).  The class B shareholders own no economic rights in OZM and 74.4% of the total 
combined voting power of outstanding OZM shares, provided that the underwriters exercise 
their option to purchase additional Class A shares.  Id. 
 56.  Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, Annual Report 46 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 
2011). 
 57.  Id.  Under the Class B shareholder agreement, the class B Shareholder Committee 
(whose sole member is currently Och) has the ability to designate five of the seven directors 
on the OZM board of directors as long as the OZM partners and their permitted transferees 
own shares representing more than 40% of the total combined voting power of all 
outstanding OZM class A and class B shares.  
 58.  Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 16, at 580 (noting that “[o]f the 85 firms 
studied, the operating agreement of only 22 firms grant public unitholders the right to elect 
all or at least a majority of the members of the firm’s governing body (the board of 
managers, in the case of LLCs, or the board of directors of the general partner, in the case of 
LPs).  Interestingly, the right to elect the firm’s managers appears to be more common 
among LLCs than LPs”(internal citation omitted)). 
 59.  KKR & Co., supra note 53, at 173.  Common Unitholders have only limited voting 
rights relating to a few matters affecting their investment, and thus have limited ability to 
influence the decisions of Management regarding the business.  First, the Managing Partner 
is not permitted to transfer all or any part of its Managing Partner Interest (represented by 
Managing Partner Units) to any Person prior to December 23, 2018, without approval by the 
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agreement is even more restrictive.  According to Carlyle’s registration 
statement, it has the power to take all management decisions internally, and 
it does not contemplate holding any public shareholders’ meetings in the 
foreseeable future.
60
 
A final mechanism for minimizing the participation of public investors 
in the voting process is perpetuating the special voting rights of the control 
group long after it has ceased to hold a majority of either the economic or 
the voting interest in the firm.  For example, Apollo includes a provision in 
its operating agreement that its control group will continue to manage the 
business and affairs of the company as long as it retains at least a 10% 
voting interest in the firm.
61
  That a 10% interest is well below a majority is 
self-evident.  Because insiders currently own a large portion of the equity 
of the firm, there is no obvious disconnect between the financial interest of 
insiders and that of public investors, but at 10% there very well could be. 
 
prior written consent or vote of Limited Partners holding at least a majority of the voting 
power of the Outstanding Voting Units (excluding Voting Units held by the Managing 
Partner or its Affiliates).  KKR & Co., Registration Statement app. 3.2 (Form S-1/A), 
Amended and Restated Partnership Agreement 16 § 4.6(a) (June 3, 2010).  Second, the 
following actions require the approval of the holders of a majority of the voting power of 
outstanding units: (1) sales, exchanges, or dispositions of all or substantially all of the 
Partnership Group’s assets, (2) an election to dissolve the Partnership by the Managing 
Partner, (3) mergers other than those that are solely for the purpose of effecting a change of 
form into a different limited liability entity in which the Managing Partner and the Limited 
Partners have the same rights and obligations.  Id. at 26 § 7.3, 40 § 12.1(b), 50 § 14.3(b). 
 60.  Carlyle Grp. L.P., supra note 51.  Carlyle has a more aggressive system.  As long 
as the “Carlyle Partners Ownership Condition” is met, meaning that holders of the Carlyle 
Group L.P. (“CGL”) special voting units (including voting units held by the General Partner 
Carlyle Group Management, L.L.C. (“CGM LLC”) and its affiliates) in their capacity as 
such, or otherwise held by then-current or former Carlyle personnel (treating voting units 
deliverable to such persons pursuant to outstanding equity awards being held by them), 
collectively, constitute at least 10% of the voting power of the outstanding CGL voting 
units, CGM LLC’s Board of Directors will be elected in accordance with its operating 
agreement, which provides that directors may be appointed and removed by members of 
CGM LLC holding a majority in interest of the voting power of the members.  Each 
member has voting power according to his or her aggregated ownership of CGL Common 
Units and Carlyle Holdings (“CH”) partnership units.  Once the total voting power held by 
the holders of the CGL special voting units (including voting units held by the General 
Partner and its affiliates) in their capacity as such, or otherwise held by then-current or 
former Carlyle personnel (treating voting units deliverable to such persons pursuant to 
outstanding equity awards as being held by them), collectively, constitutes less than 10% of 
the voting power of the outstanding voting units of CGL, the Common Unitholders are 
entitled to elect the directors of the General Partner.  Id. 
 61. Apollo Global Mgmt., LLC, supra note 49.  The control condition in the AGM 
operating agreement provides that as long as the “Apollo Group” beneficially owns at least 
10% of the aggregate number of votes by holders of outstanding voting shares, AGM’s 
manager will manage all AGM operations and activities and will have discretion over 
significant corporate actions.  Id. 
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B. Treatment of Fiduciary Duties 
In corporate entities, the lack of effective shareholder voting increases 
the emphasis placed on fiduciary duties as a governance mechanism.  
Unlike corporations, however, PPE Firms are able to decrease the impact 
and significance of fiduciary duties.  The ability of PPE Firms to disregard 
fiduciary duties stems from the choice these firms make to be 
unincorporated entities.  While Delaware corporate law allows for some 
flexibility with regard to the treatment and imposition of fiduciary duties, 
much of the law is mandatory and unwaivable.  In contrast, Delaware’s 
LLC and limited partnership statutes allow for the modification or 
complete elimination of fiduciary duties.
62
  This freedom allows PPE Firms 
to limit, modify or even waive fiduciary duties as they see fit.
63
 
A search for fiduciary duty elimination or modification in PPE Firms 
only tells part of the story.  Regardless of the particular approach taken by 
any single PPE Firm on this issue, a combination of tactics used by all of 
them minimizes or completely eliminates any protections that fiduciary 
obligations are meant to provide.  Tactics to do so include: elimination or 
modification of the duties, elimination of personal liability for breach of 
duties, and redefinition of the duties themselves, often through a “conflict 
cure” provision in the operating or partnership agreement.
64
  Each of the 
seven PPE Firms use these tactics in some combination, and the net effect 
of these actions is that fiduciary duties do not provide any meaningful 
protection for PPE investors. 
The mere elimination of effective fiduciary protection is not unique to 
PPE Firms. Professor Mohsen Manesh conducted a study of eighty-five 
publicly traded firms that were not corporations and found similar results.  
Almost half the PPE Firms waived fiduciary duties,
65
 most of the rest 
 
 62.  Manesh, Legal Asymmetry, supra note 11, at 470 (noting that “Delaware’s 
noncorporate statutes permit noncorporate firms to opt out of the fiduciary regime by 
eliminating such duties wholesale.” Manesh concludes that “the 2007 IPOs highlight a 
curious asymmetry in the law: in both substantive and structural respects, public 
noncorporations can resemble their corporate counterparts.  Yet, unlike corporations, 
noncoprorations are able to avoid one of the most basic precepts, and arguably most 
cumbersome obligation, of corporate law.”). 
 63.  Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 16, at 567-69 (“Given the contractual 
freedom afforded under Delaware law, LLCs and LPs can take one of three approaches to 
fiduciary duties.  First, a firm may choose to waive fiduciary duties altogether . . . . 
Second, . . . . a firm may want to modify or displace only certain aspects or applications of 
fiduciary duties . . . . Finally, third, instead of waiving or even limiting the application of 
fiduciary duties, a firm may intend for fiduciary duties to apply in full”). 
 64.  Id. at 570 (noting that the PPE Firms looked for provisions waiving substantive 
fiduciary duties and provisions that eliminate manager liability for breach of fiduciary duties 
(internal citation omitted)). 
 65.  Id. at 574 (noting that of the eighty-five firms studied, “42 firms fully waive the 
74 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16:1 
 
eliminated personal liability for their breach,
66
 and almost all of the firms 
had some form of conflict cure provision.
67
  PPE Firms follow a similar 
pattern with regard to fiduciary waivers.
68
  Where PPE Firms distinguish 
themselves from the other non-corporate entities in Professor Manesh’s 
study is their use of corporate board-insulating devices and their approach 
to non-corporate investor protections. 
1. Waiver 
The most straightforward approach regarding fiduciary duties is to 
take advantage of the flexibility in the statute and eliminate or modify them 
by agreement.  In fact, all seven PPE Firms have done this to some extent. 
Apollo and Carlyle have gone the furthest in this regard, eliminating 
fiduciary duties altogether.  Apollo’s operating agreement provides that “to 
the fullest extent permitted by Applicable Law, neither the [AGM] 
Manager nor any other Indemnified Person shall have any duties or 
liabilities, including fiduciary duties, to the Company, any Member, or any 
other Person bound by this [operating] Agreement.”
69
  Carlyle’s Partnership 
Agreement provides for elimination in similarly sweeping language.
70
 
The other five PPE Firms do not eliminate fiduciary duties altogether, 
but do significantly modify them, usually limiting liability to instances of 
fraud, gross negligence, or willful misconduct.  The KKR partnership 
agreement modifies the potential liability of KKR’s managing partner by 
providing that the Managing Partner will not be liable for any breach of 
 
fiduciary duties of the firm’s managers. Another 33 firms have eliminated liability arising 
from the breach of fiduciary duties. Only 10 of the 85 firms studied do not fully waive or 
exculpate liability arising from the breach of fiduciary duties.”). 
 66.  Id. at 577-78 (finding that for those thirty-three firms, “even if a manager may be 
bound by fiduciary duties, the manager will not be personally liable for monetary damages 
caused by the breach of any fiduciary duty, unless, again, the manager’s actions fit into one 
of the contractually carved-out categories of culpable conduct expressly set forth in the 
firm’s operating agreement.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 67.  Id. at 585  (stating that “practically all alternative entity firms include a conflict-of-
interests provision that describes the circumstances in which the managers of the firm may 
engage in a self-dealing or conflicted transaction—the contractual analog to the common 
law fiduciary duty of loyalty.”). 
 68.  See Steindl, supra note 7, at 8 (noting while this approach appears to be common, 
not all agree it is wise.  For example, the Institutional Limited Partners Association, a group 
that advocates on behalf of investors in private equity funds, has recommended that LPs 
should avoid provisions that allow general partners to reduce or eliminate fiduciary duties). 
 69.  Apollo Global Mgmt, LLC, Amended and Restated Ltd. Liab. Co. Operating Agmt. 
(Form S-1) 38 (July 13, 2007). 
 70.  The Carlyle Group L.P., Amended and Restated Agmt. of Ltd. P’ship (Form 8-K) 
26 (May 8, 2012) (“[T]o the fullest extent permitted by law, the General Partner . . .  shall 
[not have any fiduciary duties and shall] only be subject to any contractual standards 
imposed” under the Partnership Agreement.”). 
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fiduciary duty unless a court of competent jurisdiction enters a final, non-
appealable judgment finding that the Managing Partner acted in bad faith 
(did not subjectively believe that the decision made or not made was in 
KKR’s best interest), engaged in fraud, or engaged in willful misconduct.
71
  
The Och-Ziff operating agreement provides that “to the fullest extent 
permitted by applicable law our directors or officers will not be liable to us 
other than in instances of fraud, gross negligence and willful misconduct.”
72
 
Oaktree Capital takes a slightly different approach.  It has both a manager 
and a board of directors.  While the operating agreement relieves the 
Manager of its legal, equitable, and fiduciary duties to the maximum extent 
permitted by law, it only modifies the duty and liability of the directors and 
officers.  As a general rule, the directors and officers have the duties of care 
and loyalty that the directors and officers of a Delaware corporation owe to 
the corporation and the shareholders respectively.  However, in order to 
impose liability on a director or officer, a plaintiff must show both a breach 
of fiduciary duty and either fraud, willful malfeasance, gross negligence, or 
commission of a felony or other material violation of law.
73
  Blackstone 
also has a unique mix. It only imposes liability based on fraud, or willful 
misconduct.
74
 Fortress similarly modified, but not completely eliminated, 
the potential liability of its managers for breaches of their fiduciary 
duties.
75
 
 
2. Elimination of Personal Liability 
Another method for minimizing the impact of fiduciary duties is to 
eliminate the personal liability of managers who breach.  This technique is 
common in corporate law, but the corporation statutes all limit the ability to 
exculpate.  Corporations cannot eliminate liability for breaches of the duty 
of loyalty or other specified acts, leaving only duty of care breaches subject 
to exculpation.  There is no similar limitation on limited partnerships and 
 
 71.  KKR & Co. L.P., Amended and Restated Ltd. P’ship Agmt. (Form 8-K) 31 (July 
14, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1404912/000110465910038689/a10-
14121_1ex3d1.htm. 
 72.  Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 41 (Feb. 28, 
2011). 
 73.  Oaktree Capital Group, LLC, Third Amended and Restated Operating Agmt. (Form 
S-1) 31 (Mar. 30, 2012). 
 74.  Blackstone Grp. L.P., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1) 220 (June 21, 
2007). 
75. Fortress Inv. Grp., LLC, Fourth Amended and Restated Ltd. Liab. Agmt. (Form 10-
Q) §5.19 (a)&(b), 39-40 (August 10, 2009). 
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LLCs, so this sort of exculpatory provision can have even more of an 
effect. 
Two of the seven PPE Firms have added exculpatory provisions, 
Carlyle and Och-Ziff.  Carlyle’s partnership agreement eliminates the 
liability of the general partner and the directors of the general partner for 
any loss, damages, or fines unless a final non-appealable judgment is 
rendered concluding that the general partner and/or the directors acted in 
bad faith, engaged in fraud, or engaged in willful misconduct.
76
  In its 
partnership agreement, the limited partners also expressly acknowledge that 
the general partner has no obligation to consider their separate interests in 
deciding whether to cause the partnership to take or decline to take any 
action and that the general partner will not be liable to limited partners for 
monetary damages or equitable relief for losses sustained, liabilities 
incurred, or benefits not derived by the limited partners in connection with 
their decisions to take or not take actions.
77
  Och-Ziff’s operating 
agreement also provides that OZM will indemnify their directors and 
officers for acts and omissions to the fullest extent permitted by law, other 
than in instances of fraud, gross negligence, and willful misconduct, against 
all expenses and liabilities arising from the performance of any of their 
obligations or duties in connection with their service as OZM directors or 
officers.
78
 
3. Conflict Cures 
In addition to these two mechanisms for minimizing the impact of 
fiduciary duty breaches, each of the seven PPE Firms provide for “conflict 
cure” provisions in their organizational documents.  A conflict cure 
provision provides a procedure that, if followed, allows the entity or one of 
its principals to engage in a conflict of interest transaction without facing 
liability or other negative consequences.  The Fortress provision is typical 
in that it specifies a procedure, that will result in the Board’s resolution of a 
potential conflict of interest by deeming it a breach of the operating 
agreement or any legal, equitable, or fiduciary duty.
79
  The operating 
agreement also attempts to completely insulate the directors from liability 
based on corporate opportunity doctrine, so long as they do not engage in a 
competing business or activity because of confidential information 
 
 76.  The Carlyle Group L.P., Amended and Restated Agmt. of Ltd. P’ship (Form 8-K) 
21, 25-27 (May 08, 2012). 
 77.  Id. 
 78.  Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp. LLC, Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1) 
55 (Nov. 9, 2007). 
 79.  Fortress Inv. Grp., LLC, Fourth Amended and Restated Ltd. Liab. Agmt. (Form 10-
Q) 42-43 (Aug. 10, 2009). 
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provided by Fortress to the director.
80
  Finally, if the Board resolves a 
conflict of interest based on its own determination that a transaction is fair 
and reasonable or on terms no less favorable than those available from third 
parties, rather than by having their course of action approved by their 
conflicts committee or by a majority of disinterested shareholders, the 
operating agreement provides that in the event the board is sued, the 
plaintiff has the burden of rebutting a presumption that the board acted in 
good faith in resolving the conflict of interest.
81
 
C. Embracing the Buffer—Inclusion of Provisions that Insulate the 
Board 
Up to this point, the PPE Firms are acting in a manner expected of 
firms that are not corporations.  Both the small-firm partnership model, 
which we see in private equity fund formation, and the large-firm 
alternative entities in Professor Manesh’s study reject fiduciary duties as an 
effective monitoring device.  However, PPE Firms did not ignore corporate 
governance altogether, as its counterparts did.  Instead, PPE Firms 
incorporate heavily from one area of corporate governance—those 
provisions that boards adopt to insulate themselves from shareholder 
intrusion.  The use of these devices, particularly staggered boards, control 
share acquisition triggers, and governance rule opt-outs, is particularly 
striking because the context of their adoption is so far removed from the 
norm. 
1. Staggered Boards 
Normally, all of a corporation’s directors are up for election every 
year.  However, state corporation laws allow for longer terms, so that the 
board can be divided into a handful of classes that only get elected every 
few years.  Proponents of staggered boards argue that retaining a portion of 
the directorate each year promotes continuity.  Skeptics of the practice see 
it as a way to prevent hostile takeovers.  If it takes two or three years until a 
majority shareholder has the power to elect its own board, a majority 
shareholder is much less likely to launch a hostile bid and much more 
likely to negotiate with the incumbent board. 
Even though none of the PPE Firms are corporations, most 
incorporate some sort of board-like structure into their governance 
arrangements. Of those that do, Fortress, Och-Ziff, and Carlyle make a 
point to extend the term of their directors beyond the typical one-year 
 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. 
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duration.  Fortress and Och-Ziff use the traditional staggered approach.
82
  
Ordinarily, Fortress directors are elected for a three-year term by the 
shareholders at their annual meeting,
83
 and Och-Ziff has a staggered board 
that is divided into three classes of nearly equal size.
84
 
2. Control Share Acquisition Triggers 
Another device that corporations use to protect against excessive 
shareholder power is to prevent outsiders who accumulate a significant 
percentage of stock in the company from voting their newly-acquired 
shares.  This practice deters any shareholder from acquiring 20% or more 
of the shares of the company without first negotiating with the board. 
Blackstone, Apollo, KKR, and Carlyle all have similar provisions in their 
governing documents that incorporate this device.  Apollo’s operating 
agreement, for example, states that: 
[I]f at any time any person or group (other than our manager and 
its affiliates, or a direct or subsequently approved transferee of 
our manager or its affiliates) acquires, in the aggregate, beneficial 
ownership of 20% or more of any class of shares then 
outstanding, that person or group will lose voting rights on all of 
its shares and the shares may not be voted on any matter and will 
not be considered to be outstanding when sending notices of a 
meeting of shareholders, calculating required votes, determining 
the presence of a quorum or for other similar purposes.
85
 
This means that any person or group that is the record owner of 20% or 
more of the outstanding class A shares is not entitled to vote at meetings of 
the class A shareholders or to act upon matters as to which class A 
shareholders have a right to vote or to act.  Blackstone,
86
 KKR,
87
 and 
Carlyle
88
 have similar provisions. 
 
82.    Id. at 42-46. 
 83.  Id. at 36. 
 84.  Och-Ziff Capital Mgmt. Grp., supra note 54, at 180. 
 85.  Apollo Global Mgmt., Apollo Global Management, LLC (Form S-1) 216 (Apr. 8, 
2008). 
 86.  The Blackstone Grp., The Blackstone Group L.P. (Form S-1/A) 235 (June 21, 
2007). The Blackstone partnership agreement contains provisions that will thwart a potential 
take-over attempt. Blackstone’s limited partnership agreement contains a poison pill. If at 
any time any person or group other than the general partner, its affiliates, or a direct or 
subsequently approved transferee of the general partner or its affiliates, acquires beneficial 
ownership of 20% or more of any class of Blackstone common units then outstanding, that 
person or group will lose voting rights on all of its common units. The common units may 
not be voted on any matter and will not be considered to be outstanding when sending 
notices of a meeting of common unitholders, calculating required votes, determining the 
presence of a quorum or for other similar purposes.  Id. 
 87.  KKR & Co., Limited Partnership Agreement (Form S-1) 6, 38 (Mar. 3, 2010). 
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3. NYSE Governance Rules Opt-outs 
State corporation statutes are not the only source of shareholder 
protection.  Exchanges like the NYSE and NASDAQ have listing standards 
that also include substantive governance rules.  In the wake of the Enron 
and related corporate scandals at the turn of the century, the NYSE in 
particular implemented a number of rules designed to ensure that 
independent directors would exercise oversight over corporate activities.  
Although those rules are mandatory for most companies, there are 
exceptions.  Apollo, Oaktree, KKR and Carlyle have each availed 
themselves of those exceptions. 
Apollo (hereinafter “AGM”) describes a philosophical reason for 
avoiding the rules: a desire to preserve a management structure based on 
strong central control by its current managing partners Black, Rowan and 
Harris.
89
 AGM therefore availed itself of the “controlled company” 
exception from certain NYSE governance rules.
90
  This exception 
eliminates the requirement that AGM have a majority of independent 
directors on the board of directors, and that it have a compensation 
committee and a nominating and corporate governance committee 
composed entirely of independent directors.
91
 
 
KKR’s Partnership Agreement provides that if at any time, any Person or Group (other than 
the Managing Partner or its Affiliates) Beneficially Owns 20% or more of any class of 
Outstanding Common Units, all Common Units owned by such Person or Group shall not 
be entitled to be voted on any matter and shall not be considered to be outstanding when 
sending notices of a meeting of Limited Partners to vote on any matter (unless otherwise 
required by law), calculating required votes, determining the presence of a quorum or for 
other similar purposes. However, the Units will be considered outstanding for purposes of 
one provision of the Partnership Agreement, which provides that if the Managing Partner 
voluntarily withdraws by giving 90 days advance notice to the Limited Partners, it will not 
constitute a breach of the Partnership Agreement if at such time one Person and its Affiliates 
beneficially own of record or otherwise control at least 50% of the Outstanding Common 
Units. In addition, the units will be considered Outstanding and the limitation will not apply 
(1) to any Person or Group who acquires 20% or more directly from the Managing Partner 
or its Affiliates, (2) to any Person or Group who acquires 20% or more from a person who 
acquired 20% or more from the Managing Partner or its Affiliates, provided that the 
Managing Partner sent written notice to the Person or Group that the limitation would not 
apply, or (3) to any Person or Group who acquired 20% or more with the prior approval of 
the Board of Directors.  Id. 
 88.  The Carlyle Grp., The Carlyle Group L.P. (Form S-1) 16 (Sept. 6, 2011). Carlyle’s 
Partnership Agreement provides that any Common Units held by a person that beneficially 
owns 20% or more of any class of the CGL Common Units then outstanding (other than the 
General Partner or its affiliates, or a direct or subsequently approved transferee of the 
General Partner or its affiliates) cannot be voted on any matter.  Id. 
 89.  Apollo Global Mgmt., supra note 85, at 171. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. 
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KKR took a different approach and, while technically insisting that it 
is exempt from NYSE rules relating to board independence, KKR claimed 
it wants a majority of directors who are independent under NYSE rules.
92
  
The KKR board also voluntarily follows the NYSE rule on committees, 
naming an audit committee, a conflicts committee, a nominating and 
corporate governance committee, and an executive committee, all of which 
operate pursuant to written charters.
93
 
Carlyle (hereinafter “CGL”) and Oaktree simply opted out without 
explanation, as they are entitled to do.  CGL stated that it intends to avail 
itself of the limited partnership exception from certain governance rules.
94
 
Having done so, CGL will not be required to have a majority of 
independent directors, to have independent director oversight of executive 
officer compensation and director nominations, or to hold annual 
meetings.
95
  In listing its class A units, Oaktree also used the “controlled 
company” exemption from the NYSE rules.  In particular, Oaktree does not 
require (1) a majority of independent directors, (2) a compensation 
committee, or (3) a nominating and corporate governance committee 
composed entirely of independent directors.
96
 
III. PPE REJECTION OF NON-CORPORATE LEGAL NORMS—
DURATION LIMITS AND MANDATORY DISTRIBUTIONS 
As seen in the study of PPE Firms’ use of corporate governance 
provisions, investors should expect very few, if any, traditional corporate-
style protections against managerial overreaching.  However, the corporate 
paradigm is not the only source for investor protection and agency cost 
reduction.  Non-corporate entities have developed their own systems for 
this purpose and have arrived at solutions different from corporations.  As 
Professor Larry Ribstein notes, unincorporated entities “align managers’ 
and owners’ interests by making the managers partners in the firm, 
committing them to make distributions to owners, and providing for a 
limited term.”
97
  These devices are better tailored to the typical, smaller 
non-corporate setting, as “[t]hese incentive and disciplinary mechanisms 
substitute for costlier and often ineffective corporate-type monitoring 
 
 92.  KKR & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 235 (Dec. 31, 2012). 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  The Carlyle Grp., supra note 70, at 203. 
 95.  Id. at 203-04.  
 96.  Oaktree Capital Grp., Oaktree Capital Group, LLC (Form S-1) 7 (June 17, 2011). 
 97.  Ribstein, supra note 18, at 290.  See Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 16, 
at 564 (discussing Ribstein’s three “uncorporate” governance devices: mandatory 
distributions, limited lifetime followed by mandatory liquidation, and managers as full-
fledged owners). 
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devices, including the use of independent directors, owner voting, and 
fiduciary duties.”
98
 
Two of these three protections, the mandatory distribution provision 
and the limited duration, provide investors with legally enforceable rights.
99
  
If a manager fails to distribute cash as contractually obligated, or does not 
wind up the business at the agreed-upon end date, investors can bring an 
action in court to compel performance.  The third governance mechanism, 
manager-ownership, has no such enforceability mechanism.  It works more 
indirectly, relying on the likelihood that managers will want to do well for 
themselves and will therefore provide positive outcomes for investors as 
well. 
PPE Firms have thoroughly rejected the first two devices that have 
legal enforceability mechanisms and just as strongly have embraced the 
alignment of economic incentives.  Duration and distribution limits work 
because they constrain the discretion of management, both in the short and 
long term.  Mandatory distributions reduce shareholders’ need to monitor 
how managers use cash.  Scholars have opined that requiring “managers to 
distribute the firm’s earnings to its owners [in this way] can be an efficient 
way to constrain agency costs.”
100
  Similarly, setting a time for termination 
and liquidation limits managerial discretion.  Forcing managers to return to 
the capital markets to raise cash at the termination of each fund exposes 
them to “the discipline of the capital markets.”
101
 
This approach is followed by private equity funds and, generally, by 
privately-owned firms organized as non-corporations.  A typical fund, for 
example, is established for a limited period of time, generally ten years, and 
available cash is required to be distributed in the interim.  Professor 
Manesh found that even publicly-traded non-corporate entities rely on these 
devices to a certain extent: 
[O]f the 85 firms studied, the operating agreements of 12 do not 
compel either periodic distributions or liquidation upon a preset 
date.  The remaining 73 firms use one or both of these 
uncorporate substitutes, with 69 firms compelled to make 
periodic distributions of all of the firm’s “available cash,” and 20 
firms compelled to dissolve and liquidate upon a preset future 
date.
102
 
 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  See Bratton, supra note 33, at 2 (describing how buyout fund limited partnership 
agreements affect blockholder incentive problems). 
 100.  Ribstein, supra note 18, at 290-91. 
 101.  Id. at 292. 
 102.  Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 16, at 578. 
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This approach therefore holds true for both private and publicly owned 
firms, although Professor Manesh also finds that the constraints are not as 
effective in the public context.
103
 
PPE Firms are uniform in their rejection of these devices.  All seven 
of them lack a termination date, and there are no indications that any plan 
to liquidate at any future date.  Mandatory interim distributions are 
similarly non-existent, but with slightly more variety.  Most simply state 
that distributions are in the discretion of the board.
104
  Two firms, Apollo 
and Blackstone, state their intentions to make distributions of available 
cash while preserving their legal discretion to withhold or distribute as they 
see fit.
105
 
Apollo notes that it intends to distribute to its public shareholders all of 
its net after-tax cash flow from operations in excess of amounts that the 
manager determines are necessary or appropriate to provide for, among 
other things, the conduct of the business or the making of appropriate 
investments in the businesses or the funds.
106
  However, Apollo does not 
assure shareholders that any dividends, quarterly or otherwise, will or can 
be paid.
107
  The declaration, payment and determination of the amount of 
the quarterly dividends are solely at the discretion of Apollo’s manager.
108
  
Blackstone similarly states that it intends to distribute available cash.
109
  
 
 103.  See id. at 579 (finding that “even for those firms that contractually commit to 
regularly distribute all of the firm’s ‘available cash,’ that commitment is to some degree 
illusory.  This is because each firm’s operating agreement also grants the firm’s managers 
substantial discretion to determine what constitutes ‘available cash’”).  Further, despite the 
frequent use of contractual provisions to waive or eliminate liability arising from the breach 
of fiduciary duties, “publicly traded alternative entities have either not adopted uncorporate 
substitutes or, more commonly, adopted uncorporate substitutes that only trivially constrain 
managerial discretion.”  Id. at 583.  
 104.  See, e.g., Oaktree Capital Grp., LLC, Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1) 
(Mar. 30, 2012) at A-25.  OCG has sole discretion to periodically make distributions of cash 
or other assets to the class A shareholders in accordance with their percentage interest in the 
company on the date of distribution and the managing partner of KKR has the sole 
discretion to authorize distributions, which shall be made Pro Rata in accordance with the 
Partners’ respective Percentage Interest. 
105.   Apollo Global Mgmt., LLC, Registration Statement 14 (Form S-1) (Apr. 8, 2008), 
at 76; Blackstone Grp. L.P., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1)  (June 21, 2007), 
at 22-23. 
 106.  Apollo Global Mgmt., LLC, Registration Statement 14 (Form S-1) (Apr. 8, 2008) 
22 (outlining the rights of Apollo members). 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Blackstone Grp. L.P., Amended Registration Statement 82 (Form S-1)  (June 21, 
2007).  To its common unitholders on a quarterly basis substantially all of Blackstone’s net 
after-tax share of the annual adjusted cash flow from operating in excess of amounts 
determined by the general partner to be necessary or appropriate to provide for the conduct 
of the business, to make appropriate investments in the business and the funds, to comply 
with applicable law, to comply with any debt instruments or other agreements, or to provide 
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Blackstone states that the declaration and payment of any distributions is at 
the sole discretion of Blackstone’s general partner and that it may change 
Blackstone’s distribution policy at any time.
110
 
IV.  PPE FIRMS AND THE REJECTION OF LAW AS A 
GOVERNANCE MODEL 
 The fact that PPE Firms have turned away from legally enforceable 
mechanisms that allow public investors to monitor insiders does not mean 
that those investors are left without protection at all.  As Michael Klausner 
describes, many extra-legal forces can motivate good governance within 
firms.
111
  In particular, he points to economic alignment and the 
enforcement of professional norms as forces that can encourage positive 
behavior from insiders, even absent the threat of legal sanction.
112
  This part 
examines the use of these extra-legal mechanisms by private equity firms 
generally, and by PPE Firms specifically. 
A. Rejection of Legally Enforceable Limits 
Extra-legal norms in the PPE setting operate largely in place of legal 
constraints, in conjunction with them.  As described in Part III, PPE Firms 
are not meaningfully constrained by corporate-style protections such as 
shareholder voting or fiduciary duty.
113
  They are similarly unburdened by 
non-corporate governance mechanisms such as private contractual 
obligations to limit duration or distribute income.
114
  For public investors in 
 
for future distributions to the Blackstone common unitholders for any one or more of the 
ensuing four quarters. 
 110.  Id. at 83.  Blackstone expressly gives itself much discretion in determining whether 
and how to change its policy, stating that in determining whether to declare a dividend or 
distribution, the general partner will take into account: general economic and business 
conditions; Blackstone’s strategic plans and prospects; Blackstone’s business and 
investment opportunities; Blackstone’s financial condition and operating results, including 
our cash position, our netincome and our realizations on investments made by our 
investment funds; working capital requirements and anticipated cash needs; contractual 
restrictions and obligations, including payment obligations pursuant to the tax receivable 
agreement and restrictions pursuant to our revolving credit facility; legal, tax and regulatory 
restrictions; restrictions and other implications on the payment of distributions by us to our 
common unitholders or by our subsidiaries to us; and such other factors as our general 
partner may deem relevant. 
 111.  Michael Klausner, The Limits of Corporate Law in Promoting Good Corporate 
Governance, in RESTORING TRUST IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 91, 97-98 (Jay W. Lorsch, Leslie 
Berlowitz & Andy Zelleke eds., 2005). 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See supra Part II (detailing the non-use of corporate governance by PPEs). 
 114.  See supra Part III.  See also Manesh, Contractual Freedom, supra note 16, at 589.  
Even with some of these non-corporate governance devices, there is some skepticism that 
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PPE Firms, any protection the carrot of extra-legal incentive may provide 
will need to occur without any significant stick in the form of legal 
sanction. 
B. Emphasis on Extra-legal Incentives 
Two forms of extra-legal incentive used by PPE Firms are economic 
alignment and reputational checks.  This section describes these 
mechanisms.  It examines the PPE Firms themselves, as well as private 
equity’s use of both in their portfolio companies and in the formation of 
their investment funds. 
1. Focus on Economic Alignment 
Managers of PPE Firms continue to own very large stakes in the firms 
themselves.
115
  This ongoing interest should provide strong incentive for 
those managers to make the firm financially successful.  When the public 
shareholders gain, the insiders gain too.  In addition, if the public 
shareholders lose, managers incur a similar loss in the value of their 
holdings.  PPE insiders already use this alignment strategy in both of the 
other settings in which we have seen them operate: the formation of 
investment funds and the investment by those funds in portfolio 
companies.
116
 
In the formation of an investment fund, the purpose of economic 
alignment is to ensure that the professional fund managers are acting in a 
way that will maximize the return for the limited partner investors.  
Compensation in a typical fund is for the manager to charge a 2% 
management fee, collect 20% carried interest, and invest 1% in the 
ownership of the general partner.
117
  The 2% management fee is not 
 
they would be effective in a publicly traded alternative entity. In conducting his study, 
Professor Manesh notes that: 
 as a descriptive matter, publicly traded alternative entities are not the kind of 
uncorporations that Professor Ribstein has envisioned. Rather than trading 
corporate accountability mechanisms for high-powered contractual devices to 
discipline and incentivize managers, publicly traded alternative entities appear 
to utilize freedom of contract as a one-way ratchet: to reduce managerial 
accountability without committing to meaningful contractual constraints on 
managerial discretion. 
Id. 
 115.  Leslie & Oyer, supra note 27, at 1 (“Managers as owners is a pillar of the PE 
approach”). 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  David T. Robinson & Berk A. Sensoy, Do Private Equity Fund Managers Earn 
Their Fees? Compensation, Ownership, and Cash Flow Performance 2 (Charles A. Dice 
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performance-based and does not serve the purpose of economic alignment.  
The manager of a fund will collect its 2% annual fee regardless of 
performance. The other items of compensation do attempt this alignment. 
The 20% carried interest entitles the manager to 20% of the profits of the 
firm, sometimes after pre-agreed upon thresholds have been met.  This 
element of incentive compensation strongly encourages managers to 
maximize the profitability of the firm.  The 1% co-investment performs a 
similar function.  Because managers invest personal funds in the firm, it is 
in their interest for the firm to be profitable.  Also, this co-investment 
provision exposes managers to loss.  If managers only had upside potential, 
they may be encouraged to take excessive risks.  Requiring managers’ 
money to be at risk tempers the temptation to take excessive risks.  Also, 
studies have produced evidence that this economic alignment has been 
successful.  An examination of funds with higher fixed fees
118
 and another 
of funds with higher carried interest
119
 shows that both outperformed lower 
fee funds to enough of an extent to justify their higher fees. 
Private equity firms also use economic alignment when they invest 
funds into portfolio companies.  In this instance, the mechanism is not used 
to monitor the professional fund managers; rather, it is used by the 
professional fund managers to monitor executives at the companies where 
they invest.  Studies have shown that private equity-owned firms provide 
much stronger economic incentives than comparable public companies.
120
  
They accomplish this in several ways.  First, private equity firms provide 
large equity awards to executives at portfolio companies.
121
  Second, they 
provide these awards to a broader range of executives than do typical 
public companies.
122
  Third, they require these executives to purchase some 
of these equity awards with their own capital, thus exposing them to both 
the upside and downside risk of the investment.
123
 
 
Center for Research in Fin. Econ., Working Paper No. 2011-14, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1890777. 
 118.  Id. at 2 (“This result implies that, relative to lower-fee funds, more expensive 
private equity funds typically earn sufficiently higher gross returns that they offset their 
higher fees.”). 
 119.  Id. at 3 (“. . . we find some evidence that buyout funds with high carried interest 
outperform, which although driven by a handful of funds, is contrary to the view that high 
carried interest is excessive.”). 
 120.  Leslie & Oyer, supra note 27, at 2 (“We find that, as conventional wisdom and 
economic theory suggest, top executive incentives are much stronger at PE-owned 
companies than at comparable publicly traded companies.”). 
 121.  Id. at 3. 
 122.  Id.  
 123. Id. at 3-4 (stating that managers are required to contribute to equity sharing 
programs through purchases of equity with their own personal funds, explained by one 
interviewee in the study as a means to encourage investment into the firm by managers, 
rather than as a means of compensation). 
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2. Reliance on Reputational Checks 
Reputational constraints are a common extra-legal enforcement 
mechanism and are used in a variety of settings, from corporate 
governance,
124
 to long term contracting,
125
 to legislative interpretation.
126
  In 
essence, reputational constraints are effective in settings where a party 
restricts action in one setting and is aware that this action helps create a 
reputation that will affect its ability to act in future situations.  PPE Firms 
are good examples of where those constraints should be useful.  They enter 
into long-term arrangements, where it is less likely that parties can account 
for every eventuality over the course of the relationship.
127
  They are also  
repeat investors.  When raising funds or investing in future portfolio 
companies, the counterparties will likely be aware of their conduct in 
earlier transactions.
128
 
There is also some evidence that private equity firms have altered 
behavior in anticipation of avoiding reputational harm.  One recent study 
interviewed various participants in private equity transactions in order to 
determine the rationale for their decision-making.  Several participants 
made the point that private equity firms tend to favor managers in their 
portfolio companies due to the need to maintain a reputation for treating 
managers well.
129
 
C. Further Distance from Legal Constraints—The Attempt to Restrict 
Private Litigation 
The extra-legal governance devices previously described take on a new 
importance in light of evidence that the trend for PPE Firms will be to 
move even further away from legally binding governance mechanisms.  In 
 
 124.  See, e.g., Benjamin Means, A Contractual Approach to Shareholder Oppression 
Law, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1161, 1193 (2010) (arguing that “the minority would eschew 
judicial protection only where private ordering and other market or 
reputational constraints offered a reasonable substitute”). 
 125.  See Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. 
L. REV. 2005, 2039-49 (1987) (examining the extralegal enforcement mechanisms that serve 
to maintain cooperation over long-term contracts). 
 126.  Paul Stancil, Congressional Silence and the Statutory Interpretation Game, 54 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1251, 1279 (2013) (“But in the real 
world, reputational constraints and repeat player phenomena would eliminate, or at least 
mitigate, the risk of one-off betrayal. In a repeat player world, the availability of net benefits 
for at least one political player should ultimately produce a legislative override to an 
objectionable interpretation.”). 
 127.  Scott, supra note 125, at 2039. 
 128.  Id. at 2031-32. 
 129.  Leslie & Oyer, supra note 27, at 5 (“PE firms tend to favor managers when discord 
arises, since it is essential to maintain a reputation for treating managers well.”). 
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January 2012, The Carlyle Group, L.P., the seventh of the PPE Firms to go 
public, disclosed some details about how it intended to run its business 
after its IPO.
130
  Carlyle’s January disclosures caused a swift and uniformly 
negative reaction.  The New York Times’ Dealbook suggested that the 
offering could be “the most shareholder-unfriendly corporate governance 
structure in modern history.”
131
  Legal scholars questioned whether the SEC 
would even allow the offering to proceed given its draconian terms.
132
 
What was so unsettling about Carlyle’s approach?  Much of their 
governance structure was in line with the other public PPE Firms.  Carlyle 
stripped away most of the typical corporate governance provisions such as 
annual shareholder voting and fiduciary duties of directors.  Further, it did 
not replace those provisions with traditional partnership protections such as 
mandatory distributions or a pre-determined liquidation date.  However, it 
added one novel provision.  Its partnership agreement provided that 
dissatisfied investors would forego their right to sue in any state or federal 
court.  The agreement included a provision mandating arbitration of all 
shareholder grievances, including claims for securities fraud and 
shareholder oppression. 
The mandatory arbitration clause caused the most uproar. Investors 
questioned its desirability, and regulators questioned its enforceability.  
Less than a month later, Carlyle amended its partnership agreement, 
effectively withdrawing its mandatory arbitration proposal.
133
  The 
concession was widely praised as a victory for investors and regulators, and 
Carlyle’s IPO continued forward.  This progress happened even though 
Carlyle retained all of its other shareholder-unfriendly provisions.
134
 
Carlyle completed its IPO on May 3, 2012, and continues to trade on the 
NASDAQ.
135
  The governance provisions of Carlyle, while missing most of 
 
 130.  See generally The Carlyle Grp., L.P., Amended Registration Statement (Form S-1) 
(Jan. 12, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/15 
27166/000095012312000638/w83442a2sv1za.htm#204 (disclosing the financial 
information regarding the public offering of The Carlyle Group, L.P.). 
 131.  Steven M. Davidoff, Carlyle Readies an Unfriendly IPO for Shareholders, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 18, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/carlyle-readies-an-
unfriendly-i-p-o-for-shareholders/. 
 132. See, e.g., Miles Weiss, Carlyle Seeks to Ban Shareholder Lawsuits Before Public 
Offering, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-
18/carlyle-seeks-to-ban-shareholder-lawsuits-before-initial-public-offering.html (describing 
the legal issues regarding Carlyle’s attempt to ban shareholder lawsuits). 
 133.  Kevin Roose, Carlyle Drops Arbitration Clause from IPO Plans, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
3, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/carlyle-drops-arbitration-clause-from-i-p-
o-plans/. 
 134.  See generally The Carlyle Grp., L.P., supra note 130 (disclosing the financial 
information regarding the public offering of The Carlyle Group L.P.). 
135.   The Carlyle Grp., L.P. Stock Chart, NASDAQ, 
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/cg/stock-chart (last visited Dec. 23, 2013). 
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the protections investors have come to expect, are now in line with those of 
the other six PPE Firms whose shares trade in the US.
136
  While Carlyle’s 
mandatory arbitration provision did not become effective, the fact that 
Carlyle included such a provision in its original partnership agreement 
indicates that PPE Firms are moving away from law as a governance 
mechanism, not toward it. 
V. QUESTIONS AND CONCERNS RAISED BY THE NEW MODEL 
While Part IV describes a new governance model of PPE Firms and 
provides some evidence for its effectiveness, there are many causes for 
concern in implementing a regime that relies almost exclusively on extra-
legal devices.  Part V raises a few fundamental questions and concerns, 
including the degree of alignment of economic interests, the limits of 
reputational constraints without a corresponding legal sanction, and the 
ability of the parties to alter, and in some cases decipher, the fundamental 
agreement as it currently stands.  Part V concludes with a powerful, 
market-driven argument in favor of current practices—the idea that 
additional risks of relying on extra-legal governance mechanisms are 
incorporated into the price of the PPE Firms’ public shares. 
A. How Aligned are the Economic Interests? 
For a system to rely so heavily on economic alignment, it is critical for 
the success of the system that the incentives between the parties be 
aligned.
137
  Two aspects of PPE Firm compensation call into question the 
degree of alignment.  First, insiders of PPE Firms have already achieved 
great gains and have the prospect of further large payouts in the face of 
modest gains or even losses to public investors.  Second, managers of PPE 
Firms are able to charge fees and collect distributions that may not be 
subject to sharing with public investors. 
The ability of key managers to receive very large annual payouts from 
the firms may signify a lack of alignment with public PPE investors.  For 
example, each of Carlyle’s three founders received $57.6 million in 
2012.
138
  This payout was not unusual, as the CEOs at Blackstone, Apollo, 
and KKR all received significantly more.
139
  On the one hand, only a very 
 
136.   See generally supra Part II. 
 137.  Steindl, supra note 7 (“The general premise . . . in the specific context of PE is: the 
greater the misalignment of interest between parties, the more important effective 
governance will be to their relationship.”). 
 138.  Greg Roumeliotis, Carlyle’s founders get $57.6 million each in 2012, REUTERS 
(Mar. 14, 2013, 8:45 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/carlyle-founders-
idUSL1N0C700I20130315. 
 139.  See id. (stating that in 2012, Blackstone CEO Stephen Schwartzman earned $213 
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small part of this payout was salary; most of it came from the founders’ 
ownership of Carlyle shares and investing in Carlyle funds.
140
  In addition, 
public investors did gain in 2012.  Carlyle went public on May 3, 2012, 
closing at $22.05.
141
  Its closing price on December 31, 2012 was $26.03.
142
  
Receiving a large return of capital from investing in a fund managed by 
Carlyle, however, is not the same as collecting fee income by Carlyle’s 
management entity.  In other words, the Carlyle founders are receiving 
income from investments made to align their interests with those of the 
limited partners in its investment funds.
143
  These gains are not directly 
shared with public investors.  One portion of the manager’s compensation, 
management fees, is not a gain, but rather a cost to the limited partners.  
The profits-interest portion of the compensation is the one aspect of the 
package that does align public investors, managers and limited partners. 
 
million, Apollo’s Leon Black earned $180.2 million, and KKR & Co LP’s chief executives 
Henry Kravis and George Roberts earned $137 and $141 million, respectively).  This 
Article does not address the even more complex question of the effect of such great wealth 
on the incentives of executives to earn additional marginal dollars. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  The Carlyle Group, L.P. Historical Stock Prices, NASDAQ, 
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/cg/historical (last visited Dec. 16, 2013). 
 142.  Id. 
 143.  For a description of the competing interests of limited partners in investment funds 
and public investors in a PPE firm, see supra part I.B. 
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The other concern with alignment is whether opportunities arise for 
insiders to make returns to the exclusion of the public investors.  One such 
possibility relates to the treatment of additional charges called transaction 
and management fees.  These are charges that private equity firms level on 
portfolio companies, and that comprise a part of their compensation over 
and above the 2/20/1 system described above.
144
  “Transaction fees [are 
sometimes referred to as deal or success fees and] are charged by the 
private equity firm in connection with the completion of the acquisition for 
typically unspecified advisory services.”
145
  “Monitoring (or management) 
fees are the fees charged by a private equity firm to its portfolio company 
for ongoing advisory and management services after the acquisition.”
146
 
Dechert and Preqin did a comprehensive study of these fees in late 
2011.  One piece of information from that report that is of particular 
interest to PPE Firms is how those fees were shared among the various 
constituencies.  The report found no uniformity at all, noting that: 
 
Transaction and monitoring fees may be allocated entirely to the 
general partner and/or an affiliated advisory entity of the private 
equity firm, or otherwise divided between the other partners of 
the private equity fund.  Our survey with Preqin requested that 
private equity firms indicate how such fees are allocated.  Of the 
72 firms that responded, approximately 36.6% of the private 
equity firms provided that all or a significant portion of the fees 
are divided between all of the limited partners of a private equity 
fund.  Approximately 43.7% of the private equity firms split the 
fees evenly between the general partner and/or an affiliated 
advisory entity and the limited partners.  The remaining 19.7% of 
the firms provide that all or a significant portion of the fees are 
paid to the general partner of the private equity firm.  There was 
no discernable difference in the method of the allocation by the 
firms between transaction fees and monitoring fees.
147
 
 
 144.  See Bratton, supra note 33, at 23-24 (“Private equity firms take fees on a number of 
bases.  Most of their yield is asset (rather than profit) based.  Historically, buyout firms took 
asset fees of two per cent of the capital committed to the buyout funds per fund year. . . . 
Private equity firms also charge carried interest. . . . Finally, the buyout fund imposes 
charges on the target company.  A transaction fee is charged upon both the sale and 
purchase of a target.  In between, the target pays an annual monitoring fee based on its 
EBITDA.”). 
 145.  Dechert LLP & Preqin, Transaction and Monitoring Fees: On the Rebound?, 6 
(Nov. 2011), 
http://www.preqin.com/docs/reports/Dechert_Preqin_Transaction_and_Monitoring_Fees.pd
f. 
 146.  Id. at 8. 
 147.  Id. at 12. 
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Because of this disparate treatment of both transaction and monitoring fees, 
the discretion involved in the disposition of these funds creates a large 
opportunity for a dis-alignment of financial incentives within PPE Firms. 
B. Limited Usefulness of Reputational Constraints 
Lack of faith in the ability to rely on reputational constraints creates 
another area of concern, particularly where supposed reputational limits are 
not backed by binding legal sanctions.  This concern stems from two 
sources—the abandonment of a reputational concern by private equity 
firms in the recent financial crisis and the regular presence of sophisticated 
investors on the other side of reputational guarantees. 
1. Evidence from the Financial Crisis 
Before the financial crisis, many contracts between private equity 
firms and target companies contained reverse termination fees.  These 
provisions allowed a private equity buyer to walk away from a deal by 
paying a set fee.
148
  Even though many contracts contained this type of 
provision, it was felt that private equity buyers were unlikely to ever trigger 
it because doing so would taint the image of that firm for future buyers.
149
  
This constraint was briefly successful in stopping private equity buyers 
from canceling deals to which they had earlier agreed.
150
 
As conditions worsened in the market, however, private equity firms 
were less constrained by this reputational factor and more inclined to 
strictly honor their minimal legal commitments.  Once the first private 
equity buyer invoked a reverse termination fee, it was not shunned and its 
reputation was not harmed.  Instead, other buyers quickly followed suit.
151
  
Once that extra-legal constraint was overcome, the parties rapidly adjusted 
their expectations, focusing on the legally enforceable rule, rather than the 
 
 148.  Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 502 
(2009). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. (“Initially, no single private equity firm was willing to stain its reputation and 
harm its competitive position in the buyout market by invoking a reverse termination fee 
provision.  Instead, these firms asserted MAC claims to publicly justify termination and 
avoid being labeled as walking on their transactions and, thus, an untrustworthy future 
acquirer.  As the fall progressed, however, the reputational forces on private equity firms to 
complete buyouts became diluted as the credit markets remained illiquid and the number of 
terminated private equity deals increased.”). 
 151.  Id. at 504 (“The URI-Cerberus dispute and Cerberus’s subsequent termination of 
their agreement resulted in a further deterioration of the reputational force preventing the 
exercise of a reverse termination fee provision. In the period from December 2007 through 
February 2008, three additional private equity transactions would be effectively 
terminated.”). 
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unwritten, reputational addition to that rule.
152
  In times of distress, it seems 
likely that other purely reputational constraints of PPE Firms are vulnerable 
to suffering a similar fate. 
2.  Significance of the Sophistication of Investors 
Another concern relating to the reliance on reputational constraints is 
that these extra-legal governance mechanisms require sophisticated 
counterparties who can be aware of extra-legal norms, be in a position to 
monitor compliance, and be able to take effective action if the norm is 
ignored or otherwise dishonored.  However, it is not clear that public 
investors in PPE Firms possess this sophistication.  Even if current 
investors do, public investors are, by their nature, fluid and composed of 
different types of investors. 
One example where sophistication has mattered in the private equity 
area relates to the setting of fees.  In contrast to mutual funds, where 
investors do not possess a uniform, or uniformly high, degree of 
sophistication, higher mutual fund fees are strongly correlated to lower 
fund performance.
153
  However, when a study was done of private equity 
fund fees, higher fee funds actually outperformed lower fee funds, even 
after taking into account the fee payment.  The team conducting the study 
explained that performance was a result of the higher sophistication of 
private equity fund investors demanding higher performance, and those 
investors being willing to identify and pay for quality.
154
  This difference 
between performance of mutual funds and private equity funds indicates 
the need for sophisticated investors to monitor extra-legal constraints.  
Unfortunately, PPE investors do not uniformly possess this sophistication. 
 
 152.  Id. at 505 (“[U]nderstanding of the parties in private equity agreements appeared to 
have fallen by the wayside and the inherent optionality in this type of a reverse termination 
fee structure was realized.  Reverse termination fee provisions appeared to become 
exercisable without significant reputational impact or other external normative 
constraints.”). 
 153.  Robinson & Sensoy, supra note 117, at 2 (“This pattern [of higher fee funds 
producing higher gross returns] stands in striking contrast to results in the mutual fund 
literature, which finds a strong negative relation between mutual fund fees and net-of-fee 
performance.”). 
 154.  See id. at 3.  The data offers little support for the view that private equity 
management contracts allow GPs to charge excessive compensation for the performance 
they deliver.  Instead, the evidence is most consistent with the alternative view that limited 
partners are relatively sophisticated investors who understand the long-term nature of 
private equity investments and the limited opportunities for alternative governance 
mechanisms. 
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C. Uncertainties of Enforcement and Application 
A final concern regarding the lack of legally-binding governance 
provisions is the uncertainty about a court’s willingness to enforce a PPE 
Firm’s decision to remove generally applicable, corporate-style protections, 
like fiduciary duty waivers, without replacing them with traditional, non-
corporate style contractual limits.  Larry Ribstein, a longtime advocate of 
alternate governance arrangements, discusses courts’ roles in enforcing 
these decisions: 
 
There is an indication that Delaware courts are prepared to 
enforce fiduciary duty waivers even in a publicly-traded firm. 
The question may be a closer one if a publicly held firm 
eliminates corporate-type rights without substituting the 
partnership mechanisms . . . such as buyout rights or limited 
terms. A firm arguably should not be able to escape scrutiny 
simply by changing its name from corporation to partnership. 
Rather, the lesson of this Article is that courts need to consider 
the firm’s entire bundle of rights and obligations before applying 
corporate restrictions on contracting.
155
 
 
A closely related concern is that the broad discretion granted to the PPE 
managers encompasses the unilateral ability to amend the firm’s operating 
or partnership agreement,
156
 or to issue shares.
157
  Either of these 
circumstances adds to the uncertainty in determining the rights and 
responsibilities of parties involved in PPE Firm governance. 
D. The Mediating Effect of Price 
Public shareholders incur some additional risk when investing in a PPE 
Firm that lacks legally-binding governance protections.  However, that is 
but one of the many risks that those shareholders assume.  Their investment 
will be subject to systemic risks relevant to the US equities market and the 
financial sector, and company specific risks relating to the PPE Firm’s 
business plan and the capability of its leaders.  Those risks create less of a 
 
 155.  Larry E. Ribstein, supra note 18, at 306 (2009). 
 156.  Apollo Global Management, LLC, Amended and Restated Limited Liability 
Company Operating Agreement, Exhibit 3.2, 16, 43-45 (July 13, 2007).  The operating 
agreement provides that the Manager may amend the AGM operating agreement without the 
consent of any shareholders in many instances. 
 157.  Oaktree Capital Group Operating Agreement, Amended Registration Statement 
(Form S-1) 21, (Mar. 30, 2012).  The Oaktree Board can issue an unlimited number of 
shares at any time for any purpose on the terms that the Board determines without 
shareholder approval. 
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concern because observers assume that they are accounted for when setting 
the price of the security. 
That publicly available information is incorporated into stock prices is 
a foundational principle of modern financial theory.  This principle has 
been accepted by courts and incorporated into the securities law 
jurisprudence.
158
  If markets incorporate information when setting prices, 
then the additional governance risk the PPE investors incur could already 
be reflected in the price paid. 
However, studies differ on whether and to what extent all information 
is incorporated into prices.  As Professor Jeff Schwartz has noted, “[f]rom a 
behavioral finance perspective, information remains an accuracy-inducing 
force. But because market processes are imperfect, prices remain 
inaccurate, even in an information-rich environment. Thus, it makes sense 
to think of disclosure as improving relative stock-price accuracy, even 
though the [efficient-market hypothesis] ideal remains beyond reach.”
159
  
There is some empirical support for this behavioral approach, particularly 
when markets are required to process complex information.  In a study of 
market reaction to downgrades of collateralized debt obligations, Robert 
Bartlett found that the information conveyed in those downgrades was not 
fully processed into the market price of securities.
160
 
The extent to which the risks of foregoing legally-binding governance 
protections are incorporated into the prices of PPE Firms would be a 
fruitful area of future research. 
CONCLUSION 
 
Private equity firms have already challenged the assumptions of 
corporate governance with their hands-on management philosophy and 
their aggressive use of equity compensation.  Now, as some of the largest 
of these firms issue shares to public investors, they may be creating an even 
bigger problem.  Evidence from the seven PPE Firms indicates that they are 
rejecting legally binding governance mechanisms in favor of extralegal 
incentives.  They have minimized the impact of shareholder voting and 
waived or removed the effectiveness of fiduciary duties.  They have 
omitted contractual restraints such as durational limits and mandatory 
 
 158.  See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, An Empirical Study of Securities Disclosure 
Practice, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1023, 1041 (2006) (describing the efficient-market hypothesis of 
public information being incorporated into stock prices). 
 159.  Jeffrey Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REV. 175, 228 
(2010). 
 160.  See Robert P. Bartlett, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of 
Derivative Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, 36 J. CORP. L. 1 (2010) (examining the 
effect of derivative disclosures in the financial sector). 
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distributions that have long been favored by partnerships.  The only 
remaining governance tools are those without legal sanction, such as 
alignment of economic incentives and the moderating effect of reputational 
constraints. However, many reasons exist to doubt whether these tools 
alone will be enough to effectively combat the agency costs found in 
private equity firms. 
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